Military comment by
Fran Visnar
Page 1.
The decision is made
When President Tudjman returned from Brijuni to Zagreb on the August 3rd it was clear that the decision has been made. News from Geneva confirmed earlier estimations that the rebel Serbs leaders are not taking seriously the situation and determination of Croatian state politics to finally end rebellion and secession. Looking back on that Thursday a few significant things crop up. International situation was particularly favorable for Croatia. Americans were furious at Serbs for running over Srebrenica and Zepa. They tacitly considered that Croats could offer the fastest and most efficient aid to Bihac. Croatian army was rapidly mobilizing reserve forces. In addition to 80 000 soldiers and officers further 70 000 were mobilized (Croatian Home Guard of the 2nd echelon) and 50 000 more in the third echelon. There was not a town or urban area not participating in major defense operation. All together 200 000 combat troops were ready for the action. 25 fully equipped brigades stood at the positions facing the rebel area.
Zagreb will go all the way
Well-informed analysts figured out that it was not restricted action this time. Zagreb would go all the way regardless of the warnings its allies gave saying resistance of the rebel army would be strong or even unbeatable. Germans believed Croatian military intervention to be unavoidable. American intelligence expected Croats to succeed if they would be able to bring the operation to the end within 7 to 10 days having own losses
around 1000 dead and wounded. Noone assumed that secret plan "Storm '95" was planned even to be faster. Continuos demoralization of rebel Serbs that could not even be stopped by a professional soldier general Mile Mrk{i} is taken into account. He received his instructions from Belgrade to reorganize "krajina" defense and make it more flexible. Tactical and strategic estimations were placed on the desk of Croatian president 10 days before the operation started. The conclusion was unanimous: Serbia won't intervene for the reasons of inner instability (including the political-ideological conflict with Radovan Karadjic and Milan Martic) and in order to fulfill Milosevic's ambitions of getting economic sanctions lifted by the beginning of October. President Tudjman wanted everything to be checked out once again. Before signing the order for the operation he raises four important questions: major aims of the attack, a way to achieve them, situation among Croatian troops and the update of the situation in the enemy's army. "Storm '95" carefully looked into all scenarios. Minister of defense Gojko Susak and military and intelligence top people of Croatian army learned that the rebel troops represent mosaic of mutually incoherent military formation expected to breakdown within 5 to 7 days. According to the available data president Tudjman expected the breakdown to come even sooner, especially having in mind the psychological moment when rebels realize Belgrade abandoned them.
